




1.1 BACKGROUND STUDY 
Risk Based Inspection is used to determine what incident could occur (consequence) in 
the event of an equipment failure, and how likely (probability) is it that the incident could 
happen. Combining the probability of one or more of these events with its consequences 
will determine the risk to the operation. Some failure may occur relatively frequently 
without significant adverse safety, environmental or economic impacts. Similarly, some 
failures have potentially serious consequences, but if the probability of the incident is 
low, then the risk may not warrant immediate action. However, if the probability and 
consequence combination (risk) is high enough to be unacceptable, then a mitigation 
action to predict or prevent the event is recommended. 
Risk Based Inspection produces inspection and maintenance plans for equipment that 
identify the actions that should be implemented to provide reliable and safe operations. 
The Risk Based Inspection effort can provide input into an organization‘s annual 
planning and budgeting that define the staffing and funds required to maintain equipment 
operation at acceptable levels of performance and risk. The process will be focusing on 
maintaining the mechanical integrity of pressure equipment items and minimizing the 
risk of loss of containment due to deterioration. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Risk Based Inspection is an important tool that helps detecting the equipment criticality. 
It had been successfully conducted on several onshore plants such as Petronas Penapisan 
Melaka; Central Utility Facilities, Kerteh; Petronas Fertilizer, Kedah; and on more 
Petrochemical Plants.   
Risk Based Implementation is new to the Oil & Gas production industry and now is 
gaining acceptance by several offshore platform operators. Study on the implementation 
of Risk Based Inspection on offshore facilities is required to determine the success of the 





a) To study on Risk Based Inspection concept and methodologies for implementations on 
offshore facilities 
b) To conduct   case studies on DUYONG Central Processing Platform and BARONIA 
Drilling Platform-J 
c) To evaluate the success of RBI implementation on offshore facilities and determine the 
benefits and values generated. 
 
1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY 
a) Study on Risk Based Inspection concepts and application on offshore 
implementation. 
b) Familiarization of Offshore Facilities and equipment installations 
c) Analyze and understand RBI implementation on DUYONG Central Processing 
Platform and BARONIA Drilling Platform-J. 
d) Conduct RBI analysis based on the API Recommended Practice 
e) Evaluate the RBI analysis and implementation to determine the success of the 



















2.1 RISK BASED INSPECTION ON OFFSHORE FACILITIES 
 
2.1.1 Risk Based Inspection 
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is a systematic inspection technique and data analysis of 
equipment condition to determine the associated risk with its operation. RBI is a multi-
disciplinary approach that requires involvement mainly from operations, maintenance, 
inspection and engineering personnel to provide input on design, materials of 
construction, operating parameters, inspection data, failure history and etc. RBI involves 
the planning of an inspection on the basis of the information obtained from risk analysis 
of the equipment. Risk is the combination of the probability of some event occurring 
during a time period of interest and the consequences, (generally negative) associated 
with the event. Risk Based Inspection has capability to do the followings: 
a) Evaluate current inspection plans to determine priorities for inspections 
b) Evaluate future plans for decision making 
c) Evaluate changes to basic operations as they affect equipment integrity 
d) Identify critical contributors to risk that may otherwise be overlooked 
e) Establish economic optimum levels of inspection as weighed against risk 
reduction 
f) Incorporate ―Acceptable Risk‖ levels [1]. 
 
2.1.2 Risk Based Inspection on Mechanical Equipment  
 
The mechanical integrity and functional performance of equipment depends on the 
suitability of the equipment to operate safely and reliably under the normal and abnormal 
(upset) operating conditions to which the equipment is exposed. Performing the Risk 
Based Inspection, the susceptibility of equipment to deterioration by one or more 
mechanisms such as corrosion, fatigue and cracking is established. The susceptibility of 
each equipment item should be clearly defined for the current operating conditions 
including such factors as: 
a) Process fluid, contaminants and aggressive components 
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b) Unit throughput 
c) Desired unit run length between scheduled shutdowns 
d) Operating conditions, including upset conditions such as pressures, temperatures, 
flow rates, pressure and/or temperature cycling [1]. 
 
2.1.3 Product of Risk Based Inspection 
The primary product of a Risk Based Inspection program should be an inspection plan for 
each equipment item evaluated. The inspection plan should detail the risk related to the 
current operation. For risks considered unacceptable, the plan should contain the 
mitigation actions that are recommended to reduce the unmitigated risk to acceptable 
levels. 
For those equipment items where inspection is a cost – effective means of risk 
management, the plans should describe the type, scope and timing of 
inspection/examination recommended. Ranking of the equipment by the unmitigated risk 
level allows users to assign priorities to the various inspection/examination tasks. The 




















2.2 LEVELS OF RISK BASED INSPECTION 
 
Various types of RBI assessment may be conducted at three levels. The choice of 
approach is dependent on multiple variables such as : 
a) Objectives of the study 
b) Number of facilities and equipment items to study 
c) Available resources 
d) Study time frame 
e) Conplexity of facilities and processes 
f) Nature and quality of available data 
The RBI procedure can be applied qualitatively, quantitatively or by using aspects of 
both. Each approach provides a systematic way to screen for risk, identify areas of 
potential concern, and develops a risk ranking measure to be used for evaluating 
separately the probability of failure and the potential consequence of failure. These two 
values are then combined to estimate risk. Use of expert opinion will typically be 
included in most risk assessments regardless of type or level [1]. 
 
2.2.1 Level 1 : Qualitative Approach 
 
This approach requires data inputs on descriptive information using engineering 
judgement and experience as the basis for the analysis of probability and consequence of 
failure. Inputs are often given in data ranges instead of discrete values. Results are 
typically given in qualitative terms such as high, medium and low, although numerical 
values may be associated with these categories. The value of this type of analysis is that it 
enables completion of a risk assessment in the absence of detailed qualitative data. The 
accuracy of results from a qualitative analysis are dependent on the background and 
expertise of the analysis. 
 
2.2.2 Level 2 : Semi – Quantitative Approach 
 
Semi – quantitative is a term that describes any approach that has aspects derived from 
both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Typically most of the data used in a 
quantitative approach is needed for this approach but in less detail. The models also may 
not be as rigorous as those used for the quantitative approach. The results are usually 
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given in consequence and probability categories rather than as risk numbers but 
numerical values may be associated with each category to permit the calculation of risk 
and the application f appropriate risk acceptance criteria. 
 
2.2.3 Level 3 : Quantitative Approach 
 
Quantitative risk analysis integrates into a uniform methodology the relevant information 
about facility design, operating practices, operating history, component reliability, human 
action, the physical progression of accidents, and potential environmental and health 
effects. 
Quantitative risk analysis uses logic models depicting combinations of events that could 
results in severe accidents and physical models depicting the progression of accidents and 
the transport of a hazardous material to the environment. The models are evaluated 
probabilistically to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights about the level of 
risk and to identify the design, site or operational characteristics that are most important 
to risk : Quantitative risk analysis is distinguished from the qualitative approach by the 
analysis depth and integration of detailed assessments. 
Quantitative risk analysis logic models generally consist of event trees and fault trees. 
Event trees delineate initiating events and combinations of system successes and failures, 
while fault trees depict ways in which the system failures represented in the probability of 
each accident sequence. Results using this approach are typically presented as risk 
numbers such as cost per year [1]. 
 
2.2.4 Continuum of Approaches 
 
In practice, a Risk Based Inspection study typically uses aspects of qualitative, 
quantitative and semi – quantitative approaches. These RBI approaches are not 
considered as competing but rather as complementary. For example, a high level 
qualitative approach could be used at a unit level to find the unit within a facility that 
provides the highest risk. System and equipment within the unit then may be screened 
using a qualitative approach with a more quantitative approach used for the higher risk 
items. Another example could be to use a qualitative consequence analysis combined 
with a semi-qualitative consequence analysis combined with semi-quantitative 
probability analysis. 
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The three approaches are considered to be continuum with qualitative and quantitative 











Figure 2.2 : Continuum Of Risk Based Inspection Approaches [1] 
 
2.3 ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES AND GOALS FOR EACH LEVEL OF RBI 
Each level of RBI should be undertaken with clear objectives and goals that are fully 
understood by all members of the RBI team and by management [9]. 
 
2.3.1 Understand Risks  
RBI assessment are conducted for better understand the risks involved in the operation of 
a facilities or a process unit and to understand the effects that inspection, maintenance 
and mitigation actions have on the risks. 
From the understanding of risks, an inspection program may be designed that optimizes 
the use of inspection and facilities maintenance resources.  
 
2.3.2 Define Risk Criteria 
A RBI assessment will determine the risk associated with the items assessed. The RBI 
team and management may wish to judge whether the individual equipment item and 
cumulative risks are acceptable. Establishing risk criteria to judge acceptability of risk are 





2.3.3 Management of Risks  
When the risks are identified, inspection actions and mitigation that have positive effect 
in reducing risk to an acceptable level may be undertaken. These actions may be 
significantly different from the inspection actions undertaken during a statutory or 
certification type inspection program. The results of managing and reducing risk are 
improved safety, avoided losses of containment, and avoided commercial losses. 
 
2.3.4 Reduce Costs 
Reducing inspection costs is usually not the primary objective of Risk Based Inspection 
assessment, but it is frequently a side effect of optimization of inspection activity. When 
the inspection program is optimized based on the understanding of risk, one or more of 
the following cost reduction may be realized: 
a) Ineffective, unnecessary or inappropriate inspection activities may be eliminated 
b) Inspection of low risk items may be eliminated or reduced. 
c) On-line or non-invasive inspection methods may be substituted for invasive 
methods that require equipment shutdown 
d) More effective infrequent inspection may be substituted for less effective frequent 
inspections 
 
2.3.5 Meet Safety and Environment Management Requirements  
Managing risk by using RBI assessment can be useful in implementing an effective 
inspection program that meets performance-based safety and environment requirements. 
RBI focuses efforts on area where the greatest risk exists. RBI provides a systematic 
method to guide a user in the selection of equipment items to be included and the 
frequency, scope and extent of inspection activities to be conducted to meet performance 
objectives. 
 
2.3.6 Sort Mitigation Alternatives  
The RBI assessment may identify risks that maybe managed by actions other than 
inspection. Some of these mitigation actions may include but are not limited to: 
a) Modification of the process to eliminate the conditions driving the risk 
b) Modifications of operating procedures to avoid situations driving the risk 
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c) Chemical treatment of the process to reduce deterioration rates 
d) Change metallurgy of components to reduce Probability of Failure 
e) Removal of unnecessary insulation to reduce probability of corrosion under 
insulation 
f) Reduce inventories to reduce Consequences of Failures  
g) Upgrade safety or detection systems 
h) Change fluid to less flammable or toxic fluids. 
The data within the RBI assessment can be useful in determining the optimum economic 
strategy to reduce risk. The strategy may be different times in a facilities life cycle. For 
example, it is usually more economical to modify the process or change metallurgy when 
a facilities is being designed than when it is operating. 
 
 
2.3.7 Facilities Life Extension Studies 
Facilities approaching the end of their economic or operating service life are a special 
case where application of RBI can be very useful. The end of life case for facilities 
operation is about gaining the maximum remaining economic benefit from an asset 
without undue personnel, environment or financial risk. 
Facilities Life Extansion Studies focus the inspection efforts directly on high-risk areas 
where the inspections will provide a reduction of risk during the remaining life of the 
plant. Inspection activities that do not impact risk during the remaining life are usually 
eliminated or reduced. 
End of life inspection RBI strategies may be developed in association with a fitness for 
service assessment of damaged components. 
It is important to revisit the RBI assessment if the remaining facilities life is extended 





















Figure 2.3 : Risk Based Inspection Planning Process [1] 
 
2.4 PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ANALYSIS 
The probability of failure analysis is conducted to estimate the probability of occurrence 
of a given equipment to failure. The probability of failure should address all deterioration 
mechanisms to which the equipment is susceptible. It also will be used to determine 
which degradation mechanisms are likely to be found in each component, assess the 
current probability of failure, and evaluate for the development of the damage. 
Probability of failure is usually expressed in terms of frequency. Frequency is expressed 
as a number of failures occurring during a specific time frame. For analysis, the time 
frame is typically expressed as a fixed interval (e.g. 1 year, 2 years) and frequency is 
expressed as failure per specific time frame (e.g. 0.000005).  
In conducting Probability of Failure analysis, regardless whether qualitative or 
quantitative, probability of failure is determined by two main considerations: 
1. Deterioration mechanisms and rates of the equipment items resulting from its 
operating conditions, fluid behavior and environment (internal & external). 
2. Effectiveness of the inspection program to identify and monitor the deterioration 
mechanisms so that the equipment can be repair or replaced prior to failure [2]. 
 11 
2.4.1 Determine the Deterioration Susceptibility and Rate 
 
 
Combination of process conditions and materials of construction for each equipment item 
should be evaluated to identify active and credible deterioration mechanisms. One 
method of determining these mechanisms and susceptibility is to group components that 
have the same material of construction and are exposed to the internal and external 
environment. Inspection results from one item in the group can be related to the other 
equipment in the group. 
For many deterioration mechanisms, the rate of deterioration progression is generally 
understood and can be estimated for offshore equipment. Deterioration rate can be 
expressed in terms of corrosion rate for thinning or susceptibility for mechanisms where 
the deterioration rate is unknown or immeasurable (such as stress corrosion cracking). 
Susceptibility is often designated as high, medium or low based on the environmental 
conditions and material of construction combination. Fabrication variables and repair 
history are also important. 
The deterioration rate in specific offshore equipment is often not known with certainty. 
The ability to state the rate of deterioration precisely is affected by equipment 
complexity, type of deterioration mechanisms, process and metallurgical variations, 
inaccessibility of inspections, limitations of inspection and test methods and the 
inspector‘s expertise. 
The best information will come from operating experiences where the conditions that led 
to the observed deterioration rate could realistically be expected to occur in the 
equipment under consideration. Other sources of information could include databases of 
platform experience or reliance on expert opinion. The latter method is often used since 
platform databases, where they exist, sometimes do not contain sufficiently detailed 
information [2]. 
 
2.4.2 Determine Failure Mode  
 
 
Probability of failure is used to evaluate the failure mode such as small hole, crack, 
catastrophic rupture) and the probability that each failure mode will occur. It is important 
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to link the deterioration mechanisms to the most likely resulting failure mode. For 
example : 
a)  Pitting generally leads to small hoe-sized leaks. 
b) Stress corrosion cracking can develop into small, through wall cracks or, in some 
cases, catastrophic rupture. 
c) Metallurgical deterioration and mechanical deterioration can lead to failure modes 
that vary from small holes to rupture 
d) General thinning from corrosion often leads to larger leaks or rupture. 
 
Failure mode primarily affects the magnitude of the consequences. For this and other 
reasons, the probability and consequence analysis should work interactively. 
 
2.4.3 Quantify Effectiveness of Past Inspection Program 
 
 
Inspection programs vary in their effectiveness for locating and sizing deterioration, and 
thus for determining rates. After the likely deterioration mechanisms have been 
identified, the inspection program should be evaluated to determine the effectiveness in 
finding the identified mechanisms. 
Limitations in the effectiveness of an inspection program could due to : 
a) Lack of coverage of an area subject to deterioration 
b) Inherent limitations of some inspection methods to detect quantify certain types 
deterioration 
c) Selection of inappropriate inspection methods and tools 
d) Application of methods and tools by inadequately trained inspection personnel 
e) Inadequate inspection procedures 
 
If multiple inspections have been performed, it is important to recognize that the most 
recent inspection may best reflect current operating conditions. If operating conditions 
have changed, deterioration rates based on inspection data from the previous operating 
conditions may not be valid. 
Determination of inspection effectiveness should consider the following: 
a) Equipment type 
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b) Active and credible deterioration mechanisms 
c) Rate of deterioration or susceptibility 
d) NDT methods, coverage and frequency 
e) Accessibility to expected deterioration areas 
 
The effectiveness of future inspection can be optimized by utilization of NDT methods 
better suited for the active/credible deterioration mechanisms, adjusting the inspection 
coverage, adjusting the inspection frequency or some combination [2]. 
 
2.4.4 Calculate the Probability of Failure by Deterioration Type 
 
 
By combining the expected deterioration mechanisms, rate of susceptibility, inspection 
data and inspection effectiveness, a probability of failure can now be determined for each 
deterioration type and failure mode. The probability of failure may be determined for 
future time periods or conditions as well as current. It is important for users to validate 
that the methods used to calculate the Probability of Failure is in fact thorough and 
adequate for the users‘ need. 
 
2.5 CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE ANALYSIS 
The consequence of failure analysis is conducted to determine the effect of equipments‘ 
failure to safety, environment and economic of the facilities. Different types of 
consequences may be described best different measures. In carrying out RBI analysis, 
one should consider the nature of the hazards present and select appropriate units of 
measure. However, the resultant consequences should be comparable for subsequent risk 
prioritization. 
The following are measures of consequence in RBI analysis: 
 
2.5.1 Safety 
Safety consequences are often expressed as a numerical value or characterized by a 
consequence category associated with the severity of potential injuries that may result 
form an undesirable event. 
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For example, safety consequence could be expressed based on the severity of an injury 
(e.g. fatality, serious injury, medical treatment, first aid) or expressed as a category linked 
to the injury severity. 
 
2.5.2 Cost 
Cost is commonly used as an indicator of potential consequences. It is possible, although 
not always credible, to assign costs to almost any type of consequence. Typical 
consequences that can be expressed in ‗cost‘ include: 
a) Production loss due to reduction or downtime 
b) Deployment of emergency response equipment and personnel 
c) Lost product from a release 
d) Degradation of product quality 
e) Replacement or repair of damaged equipment 
f) Spill/release cleanup onsite and offsite 
g) Business interruption costs (lost profits) 
h) Injuries or fatalities 
i) Fines 
The above list reasonably comprehensive, but in practice some o these costs are neither 
practical nor necessary to use in a RBI assessment. 
Cost generally requires fairly detailed information to fully assess. Information such as 
product value, equipment costs, repair costs, personnel resources, and environmental 
damage may be difficult to derive, and the manpower required to perform a complete 
financial-based consequence analysis may be limited. However, cost has the advantage of 
permitting a direct comparison of various types of losses on a common basis [2].  
 
2.5.3 Affected Area 
Affected area represents the amount of surface area that experiences an effect (toxic dose, 
thermal radiation, explosion, etc) greater than pre-defined limiting value. Based on the 
threshold chosen, personal; equipment; environment; within the area will be affected by 
the consequence of the hazard. 
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In order to rank consequences according to affected area, it is typically assumed that 
equipment or personnel at risk are evenly distributed throughout the unit. A more 
rigorous approach would assign a population density with time or equipment value 
density to different areas of the unit. 
The affected area approach has the characteristic of being able to compare toxic and 
flammable consequences by relating to the physical area impacted by a release. 
 
2.6 CONSEQUENCE EFFECT CATEGORY 
The failure of the pressure boundary and subsequent release of fluids may cause safety, 
health, environmental, facility and business damage. 
Regardless of whether a more qualitative or quantitative analysis is used, the major 
factors to consider in evaluating the consequences of failure are as follows: 
 
2.6.1 Flammable Events 
Flammable events occur when both a leak and ignition occurs. The ignition could be 
through an ignition source or auto-ignition. Flammable events can cause damage in two 
ways: thermal radiation and blast overpressure. Most of the damage from thermal effects 
tends to occur at close range, but blast effects can cause damage over a large distance 
from the blast center.  
The flammable events consequence is typically derived from a combination of the 
following elements: 
a) Inherent tendency to ignite 
b) Volume of fluid released 
c) Ability to flash to a vapor 
d) Possibility of auto-ignition 
e) Effect of high pressure or temperature operations [2]. 
 
2.6.2 Toxic Release 
Toxic releases are only addressed when they affect personnel. These releases can cause 
effects at greater distances than flammable events. Unlike flammable releases, toxic 
releases do not require an additional event (e.g. ignition) to cause personnel injuries. RBI 
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typically focuses on acute toxic risks that create an immediate danger, rather than chronic 
risks from low-level exposures. 
The toxic consequence is typically derived from the following elements: 
a) Volume of fluid released and toxicity 
b) Ability to disperse under typical process and environmental conditions 
c) Detection and mitigation systems 
d) Population in the vicinity of the release 
 
2.6.3 Releases of Other Hazardous Fluid 
Other hazardous fluid releases are of most concern in RBI analysis when they affect 
personnel. These materials can cause thermal or chemical burns if a person comes in 
contact with them. Common fluids, including steam, hot water, acids and caustics can 
have a safety consequence of a release. Generally, the consequence of this type of release 
is significantly lower than for flammable or toxic releases because the affected area is 
likely to be much smaller and the magnitude of the hazard is less. Key parameters in this 
evaluation are: 
a) Volume of fluid released 
b) Personnel density in the area 
c) Type of fluid and nature of resulting injury 
d) Safety systems 
 
2.6.4 Production Consequence 
Production consequences generally occur with any loss of containment of the process 
fluid such as utility fluid (e.g. water, steam, fuel gas, acid, caustic, etc). These production 
consequences may be in addition to or independent of flammable, toxic, and hazardous 
consequences. It is considered in terms of financial. 
The financial consequences could include the value of the lost process fluid and business 
interruption. The cost of the lost fluid can be calculated fairly easy by multiplying the 
volume released by the value. Calculation of the business interruptions is more complex.  
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A simple method for estimating the business interruption consequence is to use the 
equation: 
 
 Business Interruption = Process Unit Daily Value x Downtime (days) 
 
The unit daily value could be on the profit basis. The downtime estimate would represent 
the time required to get back into production. 
 
2.6.5 Repair, Maintenance and Reconstruction Impact 
Repair, maintenance and reconstruction impact represents the effort required to correct 
the failure and to fix or replace equipment damaged in the subsequent events (e.g. fire, 
explosion). It should be accounted for in conducting RBI analysis. Repair, maintenance 
and reconstruction will generally be measured in monetary terms [2]. 
 




Risk = Probability x Consequences 
 
It is now possible to calculate the risk for each specific consequence. The risk equation 
can now be stated as : 
 
Risk of a specific consequence = (Probability of a specific consequence)  
      x (Specific Consequence)  
 
The total risk is the sum of the individual risks for each specific consequence. Often one 
probability/consequence pair will be dominant and the total risk can be approximated b 
the risk of the dominant scenario. 
If probability and consequence are not expressed as numerical values, risk is usually 
determined by plotting the probability and consequence on a risk matrix. Probability and 
consequence pairs for various scenario may be plotted to determine risk of each scenario. 
Note that when a risk matrix is used, the probability to be plotted should be the 
probability of the associated consequence, not the probability of failure [1]. 
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2.8 HOW RISK BEING PRESENTED 
 
Once risk values are developed, they are presented in such way to communicate the 
results of the analysis to decision-making and inspection planning. One goal of the risk 
analysis is to communicate the results in a common format that a variety of people can 
understand. Using a risk matrix is helpful in accomplishing this goal. 
 
2.8.1 Risk Matrix 
 
Risk ranking methodology uses consequence and probability categories. Presenting the 
results in a risk matrix is a very effective way of communicating the distribution of risks 
throughout a plant or process unit without numerical values. As shown in Figure 2.4, the 
consequence and probability categories are arranged such that the highest risk ranking is 
toward the upper right hand corner. It is usually desirable to associate numerical values 
with the categories to provide guidance to the personnel performing the assessment. 
Different sizes of matrices may be used. Regardless of the matrix selected, the 
consequence and probability categories should provide sufficient discrimination between 
the items assessed. 
Risk categories may be assigned to the boxes on the risk matrix. An example of risk 
categorization is shown in Figure 2.4. The risk categories are symmetrical. They may also 
be asymmetrical where for instance the consequence category may be given higher 
















Figure 2.4: Risk Matrix [18] 
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2.9 CASE STUDY 1: RISK BASED INSPECTION ON DUYONG CENTRAL 
PROCESSING PLATFORM 
 
2.9.1 DUYONG FACILITIES BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
The Duyong gas field is located offshore, approximately 220 km (136 mi) east of 
peninsular Malaysia. The first gas from the field was produced in 1984. The complex 
comprises three wellhead platforms (DDP A, DDP-B, and DDP-C), a central processing 
platform (CPP), a gas-compression platform (GCP), a flare tripod (FT), and a living-
quarters platform (LQP). 
The platforms that make up the main complex—the LQP, CPP, GCP, and DDP-B 
platform—are connected by a bridge. The FT is located north of the CPP and is 
connected by a bridge to the CPP. DDP-A and DDP-C are remote to the CPP complex. 
Each wellhead platform has nine well slots. Four wells were completed on DDP-A, six 
wells on DDP-C, and six wells on DDP-B. The fluids from the wells are piped to the 
CPP. Separation of gas condensate and produced water, dehydration of the gas, and 
metering and disposal of the produced water take place at the CPP. Gas is then piped to 
shore through the peninsular Malaysia gas system. 
Each wellhead platform is designed to produce 2.80 X 10-6 Sm
3
/day of gas and 330 
Sm
3
/day of liquid. The produced fluids, comprising gas, condensate and produced water 
from WPA and WPC are routed to the CPP via two separate 5.6 km and 5-km 14-inch 
multiphase subseas pipelines respectively. The production from WPB is routed to CPP 
via a 10-inch production flowline alongside a 30 meter bridge connecting the two 
platforms. 
The CPP, which forms the central hub of the Duyong Gas Field Complex, is designed to 
receive and treat 7.0 X 10-6 Sm
3
/day of gas and 1250 Sm
3
/day of condensate from the 
wellhead platforms. Three production trains on the CPP ensure continuous production to 
the OGT [10]. 
 
2.9.2 INTRODUCTION TO RBI ON DUYONG CPP 
 
Petronas CARIGALI Sdn. Bhd. has commissioned Petronas Research and Scientific 
Service Sdn. Bhd. (PRSS) to perform the RBI for their Duyong Central Processing 
Platform (Duyong-CPP) which belongs to PM12 Asset. The scope of work for RBI study 
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includes Risk Ranking and Initial Assessment of pressure vessels and piping on Duyong-
CPP platform. 
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) used to effectively manage risk in a system by focusing 
inspection on high-risk items in Duyong CPP. It optimizes inspection and maintenance 
efforts by balancing inspection costs with inspection benefits. The main objective of the 
project is to improve long-term production regularity, to increase personnel safety and to 
optimize inspection and maintenance cost. 
 
2.9.3 RBI ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY  
The CARIGALI RBI method for topsides uses a three-stage analysis process, namely 
Risk Ranking, Initial Assessment and Detailed Assessment. The method facilitates the 
development of an inspection/monitoring plan that is designed to manage the risks 
associated with loss of containment of topside pressurized equipment and piping, such 
that CARIGALI acceptable risks limits are not exceeded. 
 
2.9.3.1 Risk Acceptance Limits 
Risk Acceptance Limits have been defined by CARIGALI for the safety risk and 
economic risk as stipulated in CARIGALI Manual for Offshore Mechanical and Piping 
and were serve in accordance with: 
a) Safety Acceptance Risk Limit is given as a PLL of 10^-6 per part per year 
b) Economic Acceptance Limit is given as an economic loss of RM10,000 per part 
per year 
 
2.9.3.2 Risk Ranking (Level 1) 
Risk Ranking was performed on a system level qualitatively to determine which system 
should be addressed in the Initial Assessment and Preliminary Inspection Reference Plan 
(PIRP). The Risk Ranking process separated the high risk systems for which inspection 
activities are relevant to equipment, from the low risks systems for inspection has little 
value. The systems that have significant risk are subject to Initial Assessment. Reducing 
the number of systems by screening focuses data collection, analysis and inspection effort 
where these will have a significant effect in the risk management for the installation. The 




2.9.3.3 Initial Assessment (Level 2) 
The initial assessment addresses the individual parts in the systems identified as high risk 
in the Risk Ranking process. Operating conditions and part geometries are used to 
identify degradation mechanisms that can occur on the part. A quantitative Probability of 
Failure (PoF) is determined for each degradation mechanism. The simplified Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (QRA) model built in the ORBIT Offshore is used for Consequence of 
Failure (CoF) analysis. The safety and economic risk are calculated for each degradation 
mechanism. 
The output indicates a time to inspection based on calculation of the risk of failure for 
each tag as a function of time until that risk exceeds defined acceptance criteria limits. 
The software indicated the expected degradation mechanism, and can assign inspection 
method on the basis that the maximum risk reduction is obtained with a minimum cost of 
inspection. Some parts that have an immediate unacceptable risk, or are expected to 
become unacceptable in the shot term, shall be subjected to Detailed Assessment [10]. 
 
RISK MATRIX  
Table 2.1: Risk Category 
 
Probability of Failure Risk Category 
>10















 Low 2 >0.1 >1 >10 >100 >1000 
<10
-5
 Very Low 1 <0.1 >0.1 >1 >10 >100 




























2.9.4 SYSTEM & EQUIPMENT DESIGNATED FOR RBI ASSESSMENT 
 
2.10.4.1 System Designated for RBI Assessment 
 
Table 2.2: System Designated for Initial Assessment 
 
System Code Description Service Code 
04 Process Liquid System (L) L,PL 
10 Process Gas System G,PG,DC 
11 Process System (Multiphase-P) P 
13 Glycol System GL 
14 Fuel Gas System FG 
15 Diesel Fuel System DF 
18 Instrument/Utility Air System AI,AU 
23 HP/LP Flare System F 
62 Blowdown/Relief System B,BD,R 
64 Closed Drain, Pressurised Drain System DC,DP 
 
2.9.4.2 Equipment Designated for RBI Assessment 
 
Table 2.3: Equipment Designated for Initial Assessment 
 
No. Equipment Name 
1 D1670 Instrument Air Dryer 
2 D1671 Instrument Air Dryer 
3 D1675 Instrument Air Dryer 
4 D1676 Instrument Air Dryer 
5 E1170Glycol Cooler ‘A‘ 
6 E1190Glycol Cooler ‘B‘ 
7 E1210Glycol Cooler ‘C‘ 
8 E1250Glycol Reboiler 
9 E1260Glycol Surge Tank & Exchanger 
10 E1270Glycol Preheat Exchanger 
11 E1320Glycol Reboiler 
12 E1330Glycol Surge Tank & Exchanger 
13 E1340Glycol Preheat Exchanger 
14 E1390Glycol Reboiler 
15 E1400Glycol Surge Tank & Exchanger 
16 E1410Glycol Preheat Exchanger 
17 E1812 Fuel Gas Heater 
18 E1815 Fuel Gas Heater 
19 E1912 Fuel Gas Heater 
20 E1915 Fuel Gas Heater 
21 E2750 Gas/Gas Exchanger (West Natuna Gas) 
22 F1220 Glycol Carbon Filter 
23 F1225 Glycol Carbon Filter 
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Table 2.3: Equipment Designated for Initial Assessment...(cont‘d) 
 
No. Equipment Name 
24 F1240 Glycol Particulate Filter 
25 F1245 Glycol Particulate Filter 
26 F1290 Glycol Carbon Filter 
27 F1295 Glycol Carbon Filter 
28 F1310 Glycol Particulate Filter 
29 F1315 Glycol Particulate Filter 
30 F1360 Glycol Carbon Filter 
31 F1365 Glycol Carbon Filter 
32 F1380 Glycol Particulate Filter 
33 F1385 Glycol Particulate Filter 
34 F1650 Pre Filter 
35 F1660 Pre Filter 
36 F1680 After Filter 
37 F1685 After Filter 
38 F1820 Fuel Gas Filter/Separator 
39 F1825 Fuel Gas Filter/Separator 
40 F1885 Glycol Filter 
41 F1891 Glycol Filter 
42 F1892 Glycol Filter 
43 L1530 sales Gas and Condensate Launcher SCP-A 
44 R-2910 Pulai Gas Receiver 
45 R-2950 Natuna Gas Receiver 
46 R1000 Sphere Receiver ‗A‘ 
47 R1010 Sphere Receiver ‗C‘ 
48 SC1250 Stripping Column for Glycol Regeneration  
49 SC1320 Stripping Column for Glycol Regeneration  
50 SC1390 Stripping Column for Glycol Regeneration  
51 SDV1000 Air Accumulator 
52 SDV1010 Air Accumulator 
53 SDV1530(A) Air Accumulator 
54 SDV1530(B) Air Accumulator 
55 ST1250 Still Column for Glycol Regeneration  
56 T1890 Glycol Storage Tank 
57 V1030 Slug Catcher ‗A‘ 
58 V1040 Low Pressure Slug Catcher 
59 V1050 Slug Catcher ‗C‘ 
60 V1060 Production Separator ‗A‘ 
61 V1070 Production Separator ‗B‘ 
62 V1080 Production Separator ‗C‘ 
63 V1090 Condensate Flash Tank 
64 V1100 Coalescer 
65 V1110 Coalescer 
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Table 2.3: Equipment Designated for Initial Assessment...(cont‘d) 
 
No. Equipment Name 
66 V1130 Oil Skimmer 
67 V1160 Glycol Contactor ‗A‘ 
68 V1160 Glycol Contactor ‗B‘ 
69 V1160 Glycol Contactor ‗C‘ 
70 V1230 Glycol Flash Separator 
71 V1265 Fuel Gas Scrubber 
72 V1330 Glycol Flash Separator 
73 V1335 Fuel Gas Scrubber 
74 V1370 Glycol Flash Separator 
75 V1405 Fuel Gas Scrubber 
76 V1460 H.P. Flare Knock Out Drum 
77 V1465 L.P. Flare Knock Out Drum 
78 V1640 Utility Air Receiver  
79 V1690 Instrument Air Receiver 
80 V1910 Fuel Gas Scrubber 
81 V2050A Gas Filter (Natuna) 



























2.9.5 RBI ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
 
The Risk Ranking was calculated using the ORBIT Offshore and had been agreed by the 
members of the RBI Project Team. There are a total of 82 equipment scattered in the Risk 
Matrix based on their level of criticality. 
 
2.9.5.1 Risk in Current Year of Assessment (2002) 
 
Risk Matrix for Equipment 
 
Table 2.4: Risk Matrix for Equipment 
 
Probability of Failure Risk Category 
>10















 Low 2 1 0 0 0 0 
<10
-5
 Very Low 1 2 0 14 0 0 



















 Very High  High  Medium  Low  Very Low 
 
From the Risk Matrix, the total and percentage of the equipment according to their Risk 
Category can be concluded as: 
 
Risk Category Total Percentage 
Very High 22 27% 
High 36 44% 
Medium 7 9% 
Low 14 17% 
Very Low 3 4% 




2.9.5.2 Risk Acceptance Limits for Equipment 
The Risk Acceptance Limit is determined from the medium risk category until very high 
risk category. 
Refer to Appendix 2A for the result of Risk Acceptance Limits for the equipment. The 
result shows out of a total of 82 equipment items. 65 equipment items exceed the Risk 
Acceptance Limit, either economically, safety or both.  
 
2.9.5.3 Inspection Reference Plan for Equipment 
The inspection time is given as a number in years starting from year 2002 (year 2002 is 
0). E.g. 0.2 years means 2.4 months into year 2002. Likewise 4.0 years means the 2006. 
Furthermore an inspection task and a time to inspection are suggested. Note that only 
continuous rate modules are subject to inspection, thus inspection tasks are suggested for 
rate models only. Hence where no inspection task is suggested in the systems summary, 
the corresponding mechanism is ‗not inspectable‘, and is either above or below the 
CARIGALI accepted limit. In some cases, inspection methods are also suggested for 
susceptibility mechanisms. These are intended to detect damage but not to monitor 
development of damage over time, i.e. if damage is detected it should be sized, repair if 
necessary, and conditions causing damage shall be removed and permanent effective 
corrosion mitigation plan shall be implemented.  
 
2.9.5.4 Risk Prospects 
 
ORBIT Offshore estimates the risk per part of equipment and piping, based on the on 
dimensions materials and present operating conditions. This results in a summary of the 
Current Risk status (i.e. year 2002). In order to assess the expected development, risks are 
recalculated a few years hence, typically 5 years (i.e. 2007). This illustrates how risks are 
expected to increase if no controlling action is taken (i.e. inspection and maintenance). A 
good inspection plan should ensure that risks do not become unacceptable, and ORBIT 
offshore produces an inspection plan that aims to control this risk development. To 
illustrate the expected effect of the inspection plan, ORBIT Offshore recalculates the 
risks for a few years hence as if the inspection plan has been implemented. 
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Consequence of Failure 
A B C D E Total 
5 0 0 13 3 14 17 
4 0 0 0 4 0 4 
3 0 0 0 16 10 26 
2 0 8 10 0 0 41 
1 1 0 0 0 3 4 
Total 1 18 10 36 27 82 
 
Risk Category Total Percentage 
Very High 14 18% 
High 17 21% 
Medium 22 26% 
Low 28 34% 
Very Low 1 1% 














2.10 CASE STUDY 2: RISK BASED INSPECTION ON BARONIA DRILLING 
PLATFORM-J (BNDP-J) 
2.10.1 BNDP-J FACILITIES OVERVIEW 
2.10.1.1 BNDP-J Process Description 
The BNDP-J platform is located some 30km offshore Miri in a water depth of 30m. The 
facilities were commissioned in 1990 and the platform produces and supplies crude oil 
and associated gas to production platform BND-B via a link bridge. It consists of 5 oil 
producing wells, 2 gas injection wells and 2 water injection wells. 
Currently, the average daily production output from BNDP-J was 7000 bbl/day of crude 
and gas output is 24 MMscfd [17]. 
 
2.10.1.2 Production System 
Hydrocarbon fluid (oil/gas/water) from wellhead B59 were routed through this system 
and branched off to three separate headers i.e. test header, HP header and LP header 
(carbon steel). The corrosion damage mechanisms were similar as the acid gas contents 
remains the same at various partial pressures. The operating pressure and temperature as 
1720 kPa and 54 deg C respectively. The maximum corrosion rate anticipated is 0.13 
mm/yr. General corrosion was the most common type of corrosion. The external 
corrosion rate was expected to be 0.01mm/yr which common for carbon steel in offshore 
condition. 
 
2.10.1.3 HP Line Gaslift Line 
Gaslift gas (wet gas) for the wells was distributed by the gaslift distribution header which 
was taken from BNP-B. The gaslift is supported by backup supply from BNG-B. The 
acid gas (CO2) is the main corrosion species with damage mechanism in general 
corrosion forms. The operating pressure and temperature is 6210kPa and 54 deg C 
respectively. The expected corrosion rate is in range of 0.12 to 0.28mm/yr. The material 
is normal carbon steel with expected external corrosion rate of 0.01 mm/yr. 
 
2.10.1.4 LP Line Gas Injection Line 
The high pressure hydrocarbon fluid from BNG-B is supply as gas injection into 
wellhead BN-47/48 through gas injection header (dry gas). The acid gas content (CO2) is 
low i.e. 0.23 mol%. The operating pressure and temperature is 20700 kPa and 50 deg C 
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respectively. Therefore, a general corrosion rate of 0.12 mm/yr was used for the internal 
of carbon steel material used. 
 
2.10.1.5 Fuel/Power Gas System Water Injection Line 
Treated seawater from BNG-B5 was used for water injection system. There are no data 
available from the water quality. Generic dissolved oxygen content is assumed for the 
system at 10ppb. The operating pressure and temperature is 17240 kPa and 30 deg C 
respectively. Therefore, a general corrosion rate of 0.28mm/yr was used for the internal 
of carbon steel material used. 
 
2.10.1.6 Vent System 
The venting on the platform gathered gas vented from the equipment and piping through 
the respective relief headers. The gas was transferred to BNP-B via vent header at 
BNDP-J. The operating pressure and temperature is 200kPa and 30 deg C respectively. A 
general corrosion rate of 1.3893 mm/yr was used for the internal of carbon steel material 
used. 
 
2.10.1.7 Utilities System 
The instrument air for BNDP-J is supplied from the instrument air compressors located 
on BNG-G. The system (carbon steel) is also connected to the BNDP-B, BNP-B and BN-
14 system which can be used to provide a back-up supply to active the instrument. The 
operating pressure ad temperature is 690 kPa and 25 deg C respectively. A general 
corrosion rate of 0.05 mm/yr was used utility air and 0.0372mm/yr was used for 
instrument air [17]. 
 
2.10.2 INTRODUCTION TO RBI ON BNDP-J 
PETRONAS Research & Scientific Services Sdn. Bhd. (PRSS) was engaged by 
PETRONAS Carigali Sdn. Bhd., Sarawak Operations (PCSB-SKO) to provide a 
PETRONAS Risk Based Inspection Assessment (P-RBI) for fixed equipment and piping 
in BNDP-J, PCSB-SKO, Malaysia. The platform was in stalled in 1990 and a total of 2 
fixed equipments and 13 piping circuits were evaluated in the study. 
In general, the purpose of the study was to focus the platform inspection program toward 
the higher risk equipment components, reducing the overall plant risk of catastrophic 
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failure while simultaneously providing significant reduction in cost of ongoing inspection 
process. 
In this project, the scope of work included developing inspection plans for all static 
equipment and piping based on P-RBI technology. Consequently, it will optimize the 
existing inspection programme and eliminate unnecessary inspection tasks and locations. 
Upon completion of the study, PRSS will deliver to PCSB-SKO a complete system that 
includes RBI software and inspection database (P-RBI) for a continuous and dynamic 
risk monitoring of the platform. 
The key objectives of the P-RBI on BNDP-J are as follows: 
a) To assess and analyze the risk profile for PCSB-SKO plant through the 
application of API 580 & API 581 Risk Based Inspection methodology by using 
PETRONAS Risk Based Inspection software. 
b) To prioritize and propose inspection guidance plan for the static equipment and 
piping. 
c) To focus on the plant inspection program toward the higher risk equipment 
components, reducing the overall plant risk of a catastrophic failure while 
simultaneous providing significant reduction in cost of ongoing inspection 
process. 
d) To provide an integrated Inspection Database to capture day-to-day inspection 
and corrosion monitoring 
e) With P-RBI implementation, PETRONAS group will benefit in term of 
experience sharing, benchmarking and consistency in P-RBI implementation.  
 
2.10.3 SCOPE OF WORK 
This project scope of work covered all 2 pressure vessels and associated piping, grouped 
into 13 piping circuits, for BNDP-J platform, PCSB-SKO. The scope included 
developing inspection plans for all static equipments and piping based on P-RBI 
methodology. The project included recommendations for inspection plans that will 
optimize the existing inspection programme and eliminate unnecessary inspection tasks 
and locations. Upon completion of the study, PRSS would deliver to PCSB-SKO a 
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complete system that includes RBI software and inspection database (P-RBI) for a 
continuous and dynamic risk monitoring of the platform. 
 
2.10.4 PROCESS UNITS/SYSTEMS 
For ease of handling and managing the equipment and piping data within the software, 
the piping had been grouped into various piping circuits. Piping circuits were defined as 
sections of continuous piping exposed to an environment of similar interval corrosivity, 
similar operating conditions and similar materials of construction. 
 
2.10.5 LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND PIPING CIRCUIT 
Equipment included in the study 
Table 2.6: List of Equipments in BNDP-J 
 
No. Equipment ID Equipment Component 
1 V-800 Pressure Vessel 
2 V-0001 Pressure Vessel 
 
Piping Circuits included in the study 
Table 2.7: List of Piping Circuits in BNDP-J 
 
No Circuit ID Circuit Description 
1 BNDP-J-01A Wellheads to V-800 
2 BNDP-J-02A HP Header to BNP-B 
3 BNDP-J-03A LP Header to BNP-B 
4 BNDP-J-04A V-800 to LP/HP Headers 
5 BNDP-J-05A V-800 to LP/HP Headers 
6 BNDP-J-06A BNP-B/BNG-B to Wellheads 
7 BNDP-J-07A BNG-B5 to Wellheads 
8 BNDP-J-08A BNG-B to Wellheads 
9 BNDP-J-09A Vent Lines to Vent Header 
10 BNDP-J-10A Utility Air (BNG-B) to Sump Pump 
11 BNDP-J-11A Various Lines to T-700/701 
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Table 2.7: List of Piping Circuits in BNDP-J...(cont‘d) 
 
No Circuit ID Circuit Description 
12 BNDP-J-11B T-700/701 to P-701 
13 BNDP-J-11C P-701 to BNP-B 
 
2.10.6 RBI RESULT ON BNDP-J 
The overall risk ratings distribution for all analyzed equipment and piping items in 
BNDP-J is summarizes in Table 2.8: 
 






Overall Risk Category 
High M-H Med Low 
Pressure Vessel 2 2 0 1 1 0 
Piping Circuit 13 13 1 0 6 6 
Total 15 15 1 1 7 6 
 
Out of 2 fixed equipment items and 13 piping circuits, one item in ―High‖ and ―Medium 
High‖ risk Category respectively, 7 items are in the ―Medium‖ Risk category, and 6 items 
are in the ―Low‖ Risk category. 
The component in ―High‖ Risk category is th piping circuit BNDP-J-09A. This is 
attributed to one or more of the following reasons: 
a) Piping containing flammable hydrocarbon leading to significant flammable 
consequence. 
b) No inspection had been done on the piping throughout the 14 years service that 
leading to high probability of failure. 
c) The internal corrosion rate used in the analysis was adopted from previous 





Figure 2.5 below presents the risk matrices for equipment components  
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Figure 2.5: Risk Matrix for Equipment Components in 2005 
 
 
Figure 2.6 below presents the risk category for piping circuits 
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2.10.6.1 Risk Prospects 
P-RBI estimates the risk of equipment components and piping circuits, based on 
dimensions materials and present operating conditions. This results in the summary of the 
Current Risk status (i.e. year 2005). In order to assess the expected development, risks are 
recalculated a few years hence, typically 5 years (i.e. year 2010). This illustrates how 
risks are expected to increase if no controlling action is taken (i.e. inspection 
maintenance). Figures below show the combined risk prospects for equipment and 
piping, respectively, for year 2005 and 2010.  
 
Year 2005 
Risk Category Total % 
High 0 0 
Med-High 1 50 
Medium 1 50 
Low 0 0 
Total 2 100 
 
 
   A  B  C  D  E 
 
Year 2010 (Analyzed Year) 
Risk Category Total % 
High 0 0 
Med-High 1 50 
Medium 1 50 
Low 0 0 
Total 2 100 
 
 
   A  B  C  D  E  




























Risk Category Total % 
High 1 8 
Med-High 0 0 
Medium 6 46 
Low 6 46 
Total 13 100 
 
 
   A  B  C  D  E 
 
Year 2010 (Analyzed Year) 
Risk Category Total % 
High 1 8 
Med-High 0 0 
Medium 12 92 
Low 0 0 
Total 13 100 
 
 
   A  B  C  D  E   
 





















































































Figure 2.10: Bar Chart for Risk of Piping Circuits 
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2.10.6.2 Probability of Failure Analysis 
All fixed equipment and piping in BNDP-J were evaluated for corrosion and external 
corrosion. Figure below show the distribution of equipment components and piping 


























































All equipment components were given a rating from 1 to 5 that characterize the 
likelihood of failure. A Probability Category of 4 indicates equipment is essentially in 
‗like new‘ condition. A Probability Category of 5 indicates the equipment is less likely to 
fail than a Probability Category 4 as a result of a higher safety factor. As a minimum, a 5 
must have an estimated remaining wall of at least 1.5 times the minimum required wall 
thickness and a corrosion rate of less than 5 mpy (o.127 mm/y). Currently, all the 
equipment components fall in the 4 or 5 category. 
As for the piping circuits that fall in ‗1‘ and ‗3‘ category, after 14 years in service these 
piping were found either no inspection record that can indicates no any inspection have 
been carried out or they have no inspection record i.e. NDT data, but having higher 
calculated corrosion rtes. Hence, with both conditions it leads to high probability of 
failure results. 
The P-RBI Risk Rating includes a model for predicting corrosion under insulation (CUI) 
damage. It calculates a corrosion rate for CUI on carbon steel and low alloy materials 
over the range of 0 deg to 300 deg F (-17 deg C to 149 deg C). CUI is not expected to be 
a problem for BNDP-J because there are no insulated equipment or piping. 
 
2.10.6.3 Consequence of Failure 
With the exception of bundles, the consequence analysis modeled a release of fluid 
through the pressure-containing boundary to the atmosphere. For bundles, the safety 
consequence is modeled as well as the loss of product if a tube were to leak from one side 
of the exchanger to the other. The loss of containment consequence analysis utilized 













3.1 Literature Review  
Literature review was conducted for understanding the Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
concept and principal. Information was gathered by referring to documentations that are 
related to RBI (e.g. API Recommended Practice 580 & 581), journals, online articles and 
RBI training module.  
 
3.2 Conducting Case Studies 
Case studies were conducted on two offshore facilities which are DUYONG Central 
Processing Platform and BARONIA Drilling Platform-J. 
 
 3.2.1 Data Gathering 
For both case studies, visit has been conducted to PETRONAS Research Sdn. 
Bhd. and PETRONAS Carigali, KLCC to gather data which are related. These 
data include RBI Report, Design Basis Memorandum, Material of Constructions, 
etc. The data were organized for further analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Study and Analysis  
This stage requires study and analysis on the RBI approach that was applied by 
PETRONAS for implementation on both facilities. A meeting was arranged with 
the project team leader, En. Zamaluddin bin Ali seeking for his kind explanations 
about both projects. 
 
3.3 RBI Analysis (According to API Recommended Practice) 






 3.3.1 Probability Analysis 
Probability of Failure analysis (PoF) was conducted by considering the 
equipments‘ condition, wall thickness, corrosion rate, years in service and 
inspection effectiveness. Technical Module Sub Factor was further developed that 
reflected the PoF of the equipments. 
 
3.3.2 Consequence Analysis 
Consequence of Failure analysis (PoF) was conducted by considering the impact 
of equipments failure to health, safety, environment and production losses. The 
effect of leaking and costs of repair were taking into account while conducting the 
analysis. 
 
3.3.3 Risk Matrix Development 
From the Probability and Consequence analysis, the criticality of the equipments 
were ranked and presented by the Risk Matrix.   
 
3.4 Results Analysis 
Results and methodology taken in conducting RBI analysis were compared to the 
implementation in the case studies. This was done to identify areas that could improve 
the implementation and to verify whether the implementation was inline with API 
standards. 
 
3.5 Determination of benefits of RBI implementation  
This stage determines the benefits that were generated from the RBI implementation on 
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Figure 3.1: Flow Chart of Project‘s Methodology 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1 RBI ANALYSIS ON DUYONG CENTRAL PROCESSING PLATFORM 
(ACCORDING TO API RECOMMENDED PRACTICE) 
 
4.1.1 PROBABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
Step 1: Determination of Technical Module Sub Factors (TMSF) 
Technical modules are the systematic methods used to asses the effect of specific failure 
mechanism on the likelihood of failure. They serve four functions: 
a) Screen for damage mechanisms under normal and upset operating condition 
b) Establish damage rate in the environment 
c) Quantify the effectiveness of inspection program 
d) Calculate the modification factor. 
It covers the degradation mechanisms for Thinning, Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC), 
High Temperature Hydrogen Attack (HTHA), Furnace Tubes, Mechanical Fatigue, 
Brittle Fracture, Equipment Linings and External Damage. 
From inspection history of Duyong CPP, the main degradation mechanism identified was 
thinning. Thinning technical module established a technical module subfactor for the 
equipment subject to damage by thinning mechanism. To determine TMSF the following 
data are essential: 
a) Corrosion rate 
b) Equipments age 
c) Current wall thickness 
d) Number of highest effective inspection 
 
I. Calculation of  ar/t; 
 This number is equivalent to the fractional wall loss due to corrosion and will be used 
to determine Technical Module Subfactor (TMSF). 
Where; 
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a = Age (years in service) 
r = Corrosion rate (mpy)  




Equipment: D1670 Instrument Air Dryer 
Equipment type: Vessel  
 
ar/t = (19)(0.08)/6 = 0.2533 
 
APPENDIX 4A shows the for values of ar/t of 82 equipments in Duyong Central 
Processing Platform 
 
II. Determination the number of highest effectiveness inspections; 
 The effectiveness of each inspection performed within a period of time must be 
defined whether it is highly effective, usually effective, fairly effective, poorly 
effective or ineffective. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 provide examples of inspection 














Table 4.1: Guideline for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for General 









50-100% examination of 
the surface (partial internals 
remove), and thickness 
measurements. 
50-100% ultrasonic scanning coverage 





examination (no internals 
removed), and spot external 
UT measurements 
Nominally 20% ultrasonic scanning 
coverage or profile radiography, or external 
spot thickness (statistically validated). 
Fairly Effective 
Visual examination without 
thickness measurements. 
2-3 % examination, spot external UT 
measurements and little or no internal visual 
examination. 
Poorly Effective 
External spot thickness 
readings only. 
Several thickness measurements and 
documented inspection planning. 
Ineffective No inspection. 
Several thickness measurements taken only 
externally and poorly documented 
inspection planning. 
  










100% visual examination 
(removal of internal 
packing, trays,etc.) and 
thickness measurements. 
50-100% coverage using automated 
ultrasonic scanning, or profile radiography 




100% visual examination 
(partial removal of the 
internals) including 
manways, nozzles,etc. and 
thickness measurements. 
20% coverage using automated ultrasonic 
scanning, or 50% manual ultrasonic 
scanning, or 50% profile radiography in 
areas specified by corrosion eng. or 
specialist. 
Fairly Effective 
Nominally 20% visual 
examination and spot UT 
measurements. 
Nominally 20% coverage using automated 
or manual ultrasonic scanning, or profile 
radiography, and spot thickness 
measurements at areas specified by a 
corrosion eng. or specialist. 
Poorly Effective No inspection. 
Spot UT measurements or profile 
radiography without areas being specified 
by a corrosion eng. or other knowledgeable 
specialist. 
Ineffective No inspection. 
Spot UT measurements without areas being 
specified by a corrosion eng. or other 
knowledgeable specialist. 
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APPENDIX 4B shows the total number of highest inspection effectiveness for equipment 
in Duyong Central Processing Platform. 
 
III. Determination of TMSF; 
TMSF was generated based on the combination of ar/t calculated and the total number 
of highest inspection effectiveness. Table below shows the relationship between TMSF, 
calculated at/t and number of highest inspection effectiveness. 
 
























Step 2: Determination of Probability of Failure 
RBI analysis according to API 581, the Technical Module Sub Factor reflects the 
category of Probability of Failure (PoF). Indirectly, calculation of probability of failure 
was influenced by the equipment age, corrosion rate, wall thickness and effective 
inspection. 
The conversion of TMSF to PoF category is accomplished through a simple assignment 
of PoF categories to subfactor values based on table below: 
 
Table 4.4: Technical Module Subfactor Conversion 
 
PoF Category Technical Module Subfactor (TMSF) 
1 <1 
2 1 – 10 
3 10 – 100 
4 100 - 1000 
5 > 1000 
 
 
APPENDIX 4D shows the Probability of Failure category of equipments in Duyong 
Central Processing Platform. 
 
4.1.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
 
Step 1: Leak Sizes & Distribution 
In Duyong Central Processing Platform, the impact of hydrocarbon releases is modeled 
by considering the consequences of four different leak sizes. 
 
Table 4.5: Hole sizes assumed for consequence analysis 
 




Rupture Modeled as least of 450 
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For some degradation mechanisms damage can be expected to be sudden and extensive 
(e.g. brittle fracture) and mostly large leaks and ruptures will occur; the leak size 
distribution is skewed towards large leaks. Other degradation mechanisms, like Corrosion 
Under Insulation (CUI) will predominantly lead to smaller leaks.  
In this case the hole size distribution is such 90% of all leaks fall into the category ‗small 
leaks‘. In general the hole size distribution depend on the damage type which occur at the 
time of failure. 
 
Step 2: Repair Strategies and Repair Times 
The repair data for the various repair strategies has been selected for various types of 
equipments. Table below shows the repair strategies for the equipments in Duyong CPP 
in an event of failure. 












































































The repair strategies are meant for 82 pressure vessels included in this study. From the 
Table 4.6 above, the repair strategies is structured according to the part of the equipment, 
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materials and leak sizes. Different part will need different repair and it depends on the 
leak size and the severity of the damage. 
Table 4.7: Repair Time per Repair Method 
 
Repair Method Pipe Diameter 
(Inch) 
Description Criteria Repair 
Time 
(Hours) 
Blind Grinding No Limit Applicable to pitting with less 
than CA 
72 
Double Plate Weld No Limit Leak size less than 2‖ 72 
Equipment 
Replacement 
No Limit Applicable to Vessel and Heat 
Exchanger beyond repair 
4320 





No Limit Number of tube leaked 
> 50% 
72 
Nozzle Repair No Limit Pitting/Leak on Nozzle 72 
Nozzle Replacement No Limit Applicable to Vessel and Heat 
Exchanger beyond repair 
120 
Patch Welding 273.05 Metal Loss>50% for 6‖-10‖ NB 24 
Patch Welding 406.4 Metal Loss>50% for 10‖-16‖NB 48 
Patch Welding 1219.2 Metal Loss>50% for 16‖-48‖NB 96 
Vessel Welding 
CRA 
No Limit Pitting exceeds API 510 criteria, 
part replacement 
120 





Table 4.7 above shows the repair time required for a particular repair method. From the 
table, the repair method is applicable to certain type of damage and time taken for each 
repair is varying from one to another.  
Patch welding for metal loss consume the minimum repair time and equipment 
replacement consume the maximum repair hours. Average repair time for one part of 
equipment is 80 – 100 hours.  
Time consumed for repair affected the production loss profile of the facilities. This is due 






Step 3: Production Loss Profile 
Consequence of failure calculated as the sum of cost of repairs to equipment and 
structures damages, the result of the failed component and the cost of production 
downtime. 
When considering cost of production downtime, the individual conditions for the 
installation and system should be considered. Some systems have little or no effect on 
production, or have at least a partial redundancy in capacity. 
The costs of repair to the installation and equipment onboard shall also be considered, 
recovering material cost, fabrication, installation and commissioning of the replacement 
equipment. 
Table 4.8: Production Loss Profile for Hydrocarbon System 
 
Production Loss Profile Description 
1x0% Normal Production 
1x10% Loss of WHP-A or WHP-B 
1x20% Loss of WHP-A or WHP-B or WHP-C or Pulai 
1x30% Loss of Slug Catcher A&C 
1x40% Loss of West Natuna 
1x60% Loss of West Natuna & Pulai 
1x100% CPP Shutdown 
 





Investigation Ramp Up Partial 
Production 


















1x10% 6 0 6 45 Repair 
Time 
90 6 95 
1x20% 6 0 6 40 Repair 
Time 
80 6 90 
1x30% 6 0 6 35 Repair 
Time 
70 6 85 
1x40% 6 0 6 30 Repair 
Time 
60 6 80 
1x60% 6 0 6 20 Repair 
Time 
40 6 70 
1x100% 6 0 - - Repair 
Time 
- 6 50 
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APPENDIX 4E shows the Consequence of Failure category of equipments in Duyong 
Central Processing Platform. 
 
4.1.3 RISK MATRIX FOR DUYONG CPP 
 







1 D1670 Instrument Air Dryer 5 D HIGH 
2 D1671 Instrument Air Dryer 5 D HIGH 








5 E1170Glycol Cooler ‘A‘ 5 D HIGH 
6 E1190Glycol Cooler ‘B‘ 4 D MEDIUM 
7 E1210Glycol Cooler ‘C‘ 5 D HIGH 
8 E1250Glycol Reboiler 5 A MEDIUM 
9 E1260Glycol Surge Tank & Exchanger 5 A MEDIUM 




11 E1320Glycol Reboiler 5 A MEDIUM 
12 E1330Glycol Surge Tank & Exchanger 5 A MEDIUM 




14 E1390Glycol Reboiler 5 A MEDIUM 
15 E1400Glycol Surge Tank & Exchanger 5 A MEDIUM 




17 E1812 Fuel Gas Heater 1 D LOW 
18 E1815 Fuel Gas Heater 1 D LOW 
19 E1912 Fuel Gas Heater 1 D LOW 
20 E1915 Fuel Gas Heater 1 D LOW 
21 E2750 Gas/Gas Exchanger (West Natuna 
Gas) 1 C LOW 
22 F1220 Glycol Carbon Filter 5 D HIGH 
23 F1225 Glycol Carbon Filter 5 D HIGH 
















26 F1290 Glycol Carbon Filter 5 D HIGH 
27 F1295 Glycol Carbon Filter 5 D HIGH 








30 F1360 Glycol Carbon Filter 5 D HIGH 
31 F1365 Glycol Carbon Filter 5 D HIGH 
























38 F1820 Fuel Gas Filter/Separator 1 E MEDIUM 
39 F1825 Fuel Gas Filter/Separator 1 E MEDIUM 












43 L1530 sales Gas and Condensate Launcher 
SCP-A 5 E 
VERY 
HIGH 
44 R-2910 Pulai Gas Receiver 1 E MEDIUM 
45 R-2950 Natuna Gas Receiver 1 E MEDIUM 
46 R1000 Sphere Receiver ‗A‘ 1 D LOW 
47 R1010 Sphere Receiver ‗C‘ 1 D LOW 
48 SC1250 Stripping Column for Glycol 
Regeneration 5 D HIGH 
49 SC1320 Stripping Column for Glycol 
Regeneration 5 D HIGH 
50 SC1390 Stripping Column for Glycol 
Regeneration 5 D HIGH 
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55 ST1250 Still Column for Glycol 
Regeneration 5 E 
VERY 
HIGH 
56 T1890 Glycol Storage Tank 1 E MEDIUM 
57 V1030 Slug Catcher ‗A‘ 1 D LOW 
58 V1040 Low Pressure Slug Catcher 1 C LOW 
59 V1050 Slug Catcher ‗C‘ 1 D LOW 
60 V1060 Production Separator ‗A‘ 5 D HIGH 
61 V1070 Production Separator ‗B‘ 1 D LOW 
62 V1080 Production Separator ‗C‘ 1 C LOW 
63 V1090 Condensate Flash Tank 1 C LOW 
64 V1100 Coalescer 1 C LOW 
65 V1110 Coalescer 1 C LOW 
66 V1130 Oil Skimmer 4 D MEDIUM 
67 V1160 Glycol Contactor ‗A‘ 1 C LOW 
68 V1180 Glycol Contactor ‗B‘ 1 C LOW 
69 V1200 Glycol Contactor ‗C‘ 1 C LOW 
70 V1230 Glycol Flash Separator 1 D LOW 
71 V1265 Fuel Gas Scrubber 4 D MEDIUM 
72 V1330 Glycol Flash Separator 4 D MEDIUM 
73 V1335 Fuel Gas Scrubber 4 D MEDIUM 
74 V1370 Glycol Flash Separator 4 D MEDIUM 
75 V1405 Fuel Gas Scrubber 4 D MEDIUM 

























80 V1910 Fuel Gas Scrubber 4 D MEDIUM 
81 V2050A Gas Filter (Natuna) 4 C MEDIUM 





    5 
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Figure 4.1: Risk Matrix for Duyong CPP (RBI Analysis) 
 
 
4.1.4 COMPARING RESULTS OF RBI ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
RBI analysis was conducted on Duyong Central Processing Platform according to the 
guidelines recommended by the API documentations for RBI (API 580 & API 581).  
Comparing the result that was obtained from the analysis to the result that was obtained 
by PETRONAS Carigali, there is several numbers of equipments that were put at 


























































equipments in the ‗very high‘ category is higher and most of the equipments are scattered 
at the left hand side of the risk matrix. This means that the equipments are at high 
consequence category. 
The difference between the result of the RBI analysis and result obtained by PETRONAS 
Carigali may be due to the assumptions that were made during the calculations. There are 
some data that were maid unavailable during the analysis and assumptions were made for 
the calculation to be done. 
However, both result shows that most equipments are at high risk. Inspection planning 























4.2 RBI ANALYSIS ON BARONIA DRILLING PLATFORM-J (ACCORDING TO 
API RECOMMEND PRACTICE) 
 
4.2.1 PROBABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
Step 1: Determination of Technical Module Sub Factors (TMSF) 
The approach of determining Technical Module Sub Factor (TMSF) for BARONIA-
Drilling Platform J is similar that was applied in DUYONG Central Processing Platform. 
Each piece of equipment is a direct function of the nature and rate of the degradation 
mechanisms to which it is subjected.  
The essential steps taken are as follows: 
 Identify the damage mechanisms 
 Predict the rate of degradation 
 Assess inspection confidence 
 Identify service age 
 Determine Probability of Failure 
 
I. Calculation of  ar/t; 
 This number is equivalent to the fraction wall loss due to thinning and will be used to 
determine Technical Module Subfactor (TMSF). 
 
Where; 
a = Age (years in service) 
r = Corrosion rate (mpy)  





Equipment type: Piping Circuit 
 ar/t = (14 x 0.1299)/ 23.01 = 0.079 
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APPENDIX 4F shows the values of ar/t for 2 pressure vessels and 13 piping circuits in 
Baronia Drilling Platform-J. 
 
II. Determination the number of highest inspection confidence; 
 The confidence of each inspection performed within a period of time must be defined 
whether it is highly effective, usually effective, fairly effective, poorly effective or 
ineffective. Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 provide examples of inspection activities for 
general and localized thinning. 
 
Table 4.11: Inspection Confidence for Internal Corrosion 
 
Inspection Confidence Corrosion Type Extent of Inspection 
Very High General Internal Visual with 100% 
Visual Coverage 
High General Internal Visual with 50% 
Visual Coverage 
Medium General 4 locations per head, 4 
locations per course, 50% 
nozzles, 2 vert. scan 
Low General Less than 4 locations per 
head, 4 locations per course, 
50% nozzles, 2 vert. scan 
Very High Localized Internal Visual with 100% 
Visual Coverage 
High Localized Internal Visual with 50% 
Visual Coverage 
Medium Localized 4 locations per head, 4 
locations per course, 50% 
nozzles, 2 vert. scan.  
Low Localized 4 locations per head, 4 
locations per course, 50% 
nozzles, 2 vert. scan. 
High Pitting Internal Visual with 100% 
Visual Coverage 
Medium Pitting 50% visual coverage and 
including areas selected 
External UT with at least 1 
strip scan per head, 25% 
nozzles, 50% location 
selected 
Low Pitting External UT, scan 25% or < 
of location selected 
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Table 4.12: Inspection Confidence for External Corrosion 
 
 
Inspection Confidence Corrosion Type Extent of Inspection 
Very High External Deterioration 100% External Visual 
Medium External Deterioration 100% External Visual 
Very High CUI Strip insulation and 100% 
Visual Inspection 
High CUI Strip insulation and visual 
inspection at location 
selected 
Medium CUI Visual inspection on 
damaged or suspected 
locations 
Low CUI Random inspection at UT 
spots 
High External Corrosion Eddy Current or IRIS. 40% 
of the tubes with minimum 
10 tubes 
Medium External Corrosion Eddy Current or IRIS. 25% 
of the tubes with minimum 
10 tubes 
Low External Corrosion Eddy Current or IRIS. Less 
than 25% of the tubes with 
minimum 10 tubes 
 
APPENDIX 4G shows a total number of inspection confidences and effectiveness for 
Baronia Drilling Platform-J. 
 
III. Determination of TMSF; 
TMSF was generated based on the combination of ar/t calculated and the total 
number of highest inspection effectiveness.  
 
 







Step 2: Determination of Probability of Failure  
RBI analysis according to API 581, the Technical Module Sub Factor reflects the 
category of Probability of Failure (PoF). Indirectly, calculation of probability of failure 
was influenced by the equipment age, corrosion rate, wall thickness and effective 
inspection. 
The conversion of TMSF to PoF category is accomplished through a simple assignment 
of PoF categories to subfactor values based on table below: 
 
Table 4.13: Technical Module Subfactor Conversion 
 
PoF Category Technical Module Subfactor (TMSF) 
1 <1 
2 1 – 10 
3 10 – 100 
4 100 - 1000 
5 > 1000 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 I show the Probability of Failure category of equipments and piping 
circuits in Baronia Drilling Platform-J. 
 
 
4.2.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
 
Step 1:  Release Rate Calculation 
 
I. Determine representative fluid and its properties; 
Baronia Drilling Platform-J produces hydrocarbon liquid and gas from its wellhead. 
APPENDIX 4J shows the representative fluid of each equipment and piping circuit. 
 
II. Inventory category for the equipment; 




Table 4.14: Inventory Category Ranges 
 
Category Range Value used in 
calculations 
A 100 to 1000 lbs 500 
B 1000 to 10 000 lbs 5000 
C 10 000 to 100 000 lbs 50,000 
D 100 000 to 1 000 000 lbs 500,000 
E 1 000 000 to 10 000 000 lbs 5,000,000 
 
The inventory category was chosen based on default inventory value. The inventory 
default value is based on initial fluid phase inside the pressure boundary. It is set to be as 
follows:  
 Initial Gas Phase: 4,536 kg or 10,000 lb 
 Initial Liquid Phase: 18,144 kg or 40,000 lb 
 
Thus inventory category was chosen as ‗B‘ for Initial Gas Phase and ‗C‘ for Initial Liquid 
Phase. 
 
III. Detection and Isolation rating applicable to detection and isolation systems present 
in the area;  
Table 9 below, provides guidance for assigning a qualitative letter rating (A, B or 
C) to the unit‘s detection and isolation systems. These letter ratings will be used 
later in the consequence estimation sections to determine the effect of the mitigation 
systems on final consequences. Detection system rating ‗A‘ usually found only in 
specialty chemical applications. 
Both detection and isolation rating applicable to the systems presented in BNDP-J 
were chosen as ‗B‘ or in average conditions. The information in   Table 4.16 will 
only be used when evaluating the consequences of continuous-type releases. If 
more than 10 000 lbs of fluid were released in 5 minutes, the process of assessing 


















IV. Estimate leak duration based on duration and detection systems; 
The quality ratings of the detection and isolation systems have been translated into 
an estimation of leak duration in Table 10. Total leak duration presented in the table 
is the sum of the time to detect the leak, analyze the incident and decide upon 
corrective action, and time to complete appropriate actions. 
 








20 minutes for ¼ inch. leaks 
10 minutes for 1 inch leaks 
5 minutes for 4 inch leaks  
A B 
30 minutes for ¼ inch leaks 
20 minutes for 1 inch leaks 
10 minutes for 4 inch leaks 
 
Type of Detection System Classification 
Instrumentation designed specifically to detect material losses by 
changes in operating conditions (i.e. loss of pressure or flow) in 
the system. 
A 
Suitably located detectors to determine when the material is 
present outside the pressure-containing envelope. 
B 
Visual detection, cameras, or detectors with marginal coverage. C 
Type of Isolation System Classification 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated directly from process 
instrumentation or detectors, with no operator intervention. 
A 
Isolation or shutdown systems activated by operators in the 
control room or other suitable locations remote from the leak. 
B 
Isolation dependent on manually-operated valves. C 
 61 









40 minutes for ¼ inch leaks 
30 minutes for 1 inch leaks 
20 minutes for 4 inch leaks 
B A or B 
40 minutes for ¼ inch leaks 
30 minutes for 1 inch leaks 
20 minutes for 4 inch leaks 
B C 
1 hour for ¼ inch leaks 
30 minutes for 1 inch leaks 
20 minutes for 4 inch leaks 
 
Based on detection and isolation systems rating ‗B‘ at BNDP-J, the leak durations for 
each hole size was determined to be 40 minutes for ¼ inch leaks, 30 minutes for 1 inch 
leaks and 20 minutes for 4 inch leaks.   
 
V. Operating Conditions; 
APPENDIX 4K shows the operating Conditions for equipments and piping circuit 
in BNDP-J  
 
VI. Fluid Initial Phase 









VII. Liquid release rate; 
Release rates depend on the physical properties of the material, initial phase, and 
process condition. Release rate equation was chosen based on the phase of the 
material when it is inside the equipment and its discharge regime as the material is 
released. For the liquid phase, release rate was calculated for each hole size using 






ACQ    
   where 
                                          LQ   = liquid discharge rate (lbs/sec) 
                                          dC   = discharge coefficient 
         A    = hole cross-sectional area (sq in) 
                                             = density of liquid (lb/ft³) 
               cg  = conversion factor (32.2 lbm-ft / lbf-sec²) 
                                 
The discharge coefficient for fully turbulent flow from sharp-edged 
orifices is 0.60 to 0.64. A value of 0.61 is recommended for the purpose 
of RBI calculations. Results from the calculation of liquid release rate 
for each hole size were shown in Table 11;  
 
Table 4.17: Liquid release rate for equipment (vessels and piping) 
 
Hole Size Release Rate (lb/sec) 
¼ inch. 1.34 
1 inch. 5.37 




Step2: Determination of Release Type 
 
Two types of release were considered in RBI analysis which include instantaneous and 
continuous.  
a) Instantaneous release - occurs so rapidly that the fluid disperses as a single large 
cloud or pool.  
b) Continuous release - occurs over a longer period of time, allowing the fluid to 
disperse in the shape of an elongated ellipse. 
 
 It is very important to properly determine the release type either instantaneous or 
continuous. The calculated consequences can differ greatly depending on the type chosen 
to represent the release. All ―small‖ (1/4 inch) holes were considered as continuous type. 
If it takes less than 5 minutes to release 10 000 pounds, the release type for the given hole 
size is instantaneous. Calculation for the amount of release for each hole size in 5 minutes 
time shown below: 
 
 ¼ inch. :  (1.34 lb/sec) x (60 x 5) sec = 402 lbs 
  1 inch. :  (5.37 lb/sec) x (60 x 5) sec = 1,611 lbs 
  4 inch. :  ( 21.48 b/sec) x (60 x 5) sec = 6,444 lbs 
             Rupture : (85.92 lb/sec) x (60 x 5) sec = 25,776 lbs 
 
From the calculated release rate, hole size of ¼ inch, 1 inch and 4 inches were considered 
as continuous release type while for rupture (more than 6 inches) was considered as 
instantaneous release type.  
 
Step 3:    Determination of phase after release 
 
The dispersion characteristic of a fluid after release depends on the phase (gas or liquid) 
in the environment. If there is no change of phase for the fluid when going from steady-
state operating conditions to steady-state ambient conditions, the final phase of the fluid 
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is the same as the initial phase. If the fluid would tend to change state after release, it 
maybe difficult to assess the phase of the material for the purpose of consequence 
calculations. 
 
APPENDIX 4M shows the Consequence of Failure category of equipments and piping 
circuits in Baronia Drilling Platform-J. 
 
4.2.3 RISK MATRIX FOR BARONIA DRILLING PLATFORM-J 
 
Table 4.18: Summary of Risk Ranking for equipments and piping circuits in BNDP-J 
 
No Equipment ID 
Equipment 
Type PoF CoF Criticality 
1 V-800 Pressure Vessel 4 D MEDIUM 
2 V-0001 Pressure Vessel 2 D LOW 
3 BNDP-J-01A Piping Circuit 2 C LOW 
4 BNDP-J-02A Piping Circuit 2 C LOW 
5 BNDP-J-03A Piping Circuit 2 C LOW 
6 BNDP-J-04A Piping Circuit 1 D LOW 
7 BNDP-J-05A Piping Circuit 1 C VERY LOW 
8 BNDP-J-06A Piping Circuit 1 D LOW 
9 BNDP-J-07A Piping Circuit 3 A VERY LOW 
10 BNDP-J-08A Piping Circuit 2 D LOW 
11 BNDP-J-09A Piping Circuit 5 C HIGH 
12 BNDP-J-10A Piping Circuit 3 A VERY LOW 
13 BNDP-J-11A Piping Circuit 1 C VERY LOW 
14 BNDP-J-11B Piping Circuit 1 B VERY LOW 
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4.2.4 COMPARING RESULTS OF RBI ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
RBI analysis was conducted on BARONIA Drilling Platform-J according to the 
recommended practice by API (API 580 & API 581). 
From the analysis that had been conducted, the results obtained are similar with the 
results of PETRONAS Carigali. The risk ranking for all 13 piping circuits and 2 pressure 
vessels are the same for both results. 
This shows that the approach applied by PETRONS Carigali-SKO are inline with the API 
Recommended Practice and they had effectively implemented RBI on BARONIA 















































































4.3 BENEFITS OF RBI IMPLEMENTATION ON DUYONG CENTRAL 
PROCESSING PLATFORM & BARONIA DRILLING PLATFORM-J 
 
4.3.1 COST CONTROL 
4.3.1.1 Inspection Cost 
Inspection costs can be more effectively managed through the utilization of RBI. 
Resources can be applied or shifted to those areas identified as a higher risk or targeted 
based on the strategy selected. Consequently, this same strategy allows consideration for 
reduction of inspection activities in those areas that have a lower risk or where the 
inspection activity has little or no affect on the associated risks. These results in 
inspection resources being applied where they are needed the most. 
Another opportunity for managing inspection costs is by identifying items in the 
inspection plan that can be inspected non-intrusively on-stream. If the non-intrusive 
inspection provides sufficient risk management, then there is a potential for a net savings 
based on not having blind, open, clean, and internally inspect during downtime. If the 
item considered is the main driver for bringing an operational unit down, then the non-
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intrusive inspection may contribute to increased uptime of the unit. The user should 
recognize that while there is a potential for the reduction of inspection costs through the 
utilization of RBI, equipment integrity and inspection cost optimization should remain 
the focus [11]. 
 
4.3.1.2 Life-Cycle Cost 
Not only can RBI be used to optimize inspection costs that directly affect life cycle costs, 
it can assist in lowering overall life cycle cost through various cost benefit assessments. 
The following examples can give user ideas on how to lower life cycle costs through RBI 
with cost benefit assessments. 
 RBI should enhance the prediction of failures caused by deterioration 
mechanisms. This in turn should give the user confidence to continue to operate 
equipment safely, closer to the predict failure date. By doing this, the equipment 
cycle time should increase and life costs decrease. 
 RBI can be used to assess the effects of changing to a more aggressive fluid. A 
subsequent plan to upgrade construction material or to replace specific items can 
then be developed. The construction material plan would consider the optimized 
run length safely attainable along with the appropriate inspection plan. This could 
adequate to increased profits and lower life cycle costs through maintenance, 
optimized inspections, and increased unit/equipment uptime. 
 Turnaround and maintenance costs also have an affect on the life cycle costs of an 
equipment item. By using the results of the RBI inspection plan to identify more 
accurately where to inspect and what repairs and replacements to expect, 
turnaround and maintenance work can be preplanned and, in some cases, executed 
at a lower cost than if unplanned. 
 
4.3.2 INSPECTION COSTS ESTIMATION FOR DUYONG CPP 
4.3.2.1 Estimation of Inspection Costs 
Costs of an inspection activity vary between pressure vessels and piping system. Usually, 
pressure vessels need to have a greater coverage of inspection compared to piping 
system. For a full coverage of inspection, we need to open the vessel. The operation need 
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to be shutdown so that the vessel can be open and inspection can be conducted. Type of 
inspection for Pressure Vessel includes: 
 Visual Internal & External Inspection 
 NDE-Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement 
 NDE-Radiography Technique 
 Floor Scan 
 Eddy Current/IRIS 
 
4.3.2.2 Estimation of Inspection Cost without RBI 
In quoting the total costs of inspection, the costs of the hiring manpower, equipments and 
tools, mobilizing and demobilizing of manpower, and inspection expertise need to be 
included. The following table shows the estimated total cost of a full coverage of 
inspecting a pressure vessel. 
Table 4.19: Estimated total cost of a full coverage of inspecting a pressure vessel. 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 1  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Opening Vessel 
 Visual (External &Internal) 
 NDE-UT 
 Eddy Current/IRIS 







TOTAL RM 20,681.50 
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The inspection activity is quoted as a lump sum amount for the ease of calculation. The 
inspection methods include visual inspection internally and externally, UT, and Eddy 
Current inspection. There are 4 manpower involved in the inspection and they are paid 
according to day rate. 
 
During a shutdown period, where every 82 pressure vessels need to be inspected, the 
numbers of manpower involve and total hours of manpower‘s service will be increase. 
The following table shows the total cost if every 82 pressure vessels need to be inspected. 
 
Table 4.20: Estimated total cost if every 82 pressure vessels need to be inspected. 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 9  Offshore rate for an Inspection Engineer 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 8  Offshore rate for a Qualified Inspector 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





3  Inspection Coverage: 
 Opening Vessel 
 Visual (External &Internal) 
 NDE-UT 
 Eddy Current/IRIS 











The total amount of inspection cost shown above is the amount of Duyong CPP spent for 
a full coverage of pressure vessel inspection for an interval period 5 years. The inspection 
is conducted on every 82 equipments regardless the criticality of the equipment. 
 
Conventionally, inspection activity was rather conducted based on time or condition of 
the equipments. In estimating cost of inspection without RBI, it is assumed that half the 
total number of equipments i.e. 42 equipments are inspected due to their conditions. 
Thus, the estimated cost of inspection for the Year 2003-2007 and Year 2008-2012 are as 
follows: 
Table 4.21: Estimated Inspection costs without RBI for Year 2003-2007 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 9  Offshore rate for an Inspection Engineer 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 8  Offshore rate for a Qualified Inspector 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





3  Inspection Coverage: 
 Opening Vessel 
 Visual (External &Internal) 
 NDE-UT 
 Eddy Current/IRIS 
















Table 4.22: Estimated Inspection costs without RBI for Year 2008-2012 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 9  Offshore rate for an Inspection Engineer 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 8  Offshore rate for a Qualified Inspector 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





3  Inspection Coverage: 
 Opening Vessel 
 Visual (External &Internal) 
 NDE-UT 
 Eddy Current/IRIS 












4.3.2.3 Estimation of Inspection Cost with RBI 
Inspection costs can be more effectively managed through the utilization of Risk Based 
Inspection on Duyong CPP. Resources can be applied or shifted to those areas identified 
as a higher risk or targeted based on the strategy selected. Consequently, this same 
strategy allows consideration for reduction of inspection activities in those areas that have 
a lower risk or where the inspection activity has little or no affect on the associated risks. 
These results in inspection resources being applied where they are needed the most. 
According to the inspection planning that was developed, from the 82 equipments there 
are equipments that don‘t need full surveillance and they only need certain coverage and 
method of inspection. This is depending on the criticality of the equipment and risk 
associated with the equipment. 
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During the year 2002, there are 61 equipments that need to undergo Internal Inspection, 7 
equipments for Extensive Inspection (both Internal & External Inspection), 6 for 
Preventive Maintenance and 8 no need for inspection. 
The estimated inspection cost for the year 2002 is as follows: 
 
Table 4.23: Estimated inspection cost for the year 2002 for Duyong CPP 
 
Item No. Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 6  Offshore rate for an Inspection Engineer 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 6  Offshore rate for a Qualified Inspector 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Opening Vessel 
 Visual Inspection (Internal & External) 
 NDE-Ultrasound Thickness Measurement 








After the inspection and rectification to the equipment, the next inspection programme is 
planned for next 5 years interval (2003-2007). There are 17 equipments that are subjected 
for Internal Inspection. The inspection is covered for Visual and NDE-UT. 






Table 4.24: Estimated costs for the inspection for Year 2003-Year 2007 for Duyong CPP 
 
Item No. Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 2  Offshore rate for an Inspection Engineer 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 2  Offshore rate for a Qualified Inspector 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Opening Vessel 
 Visual Inspection (Internal ) 
 NDE-Ultrasound Thickness Measurement 








After the inspection and rectification of the equipment, the next inspection planning is 
between the Year 2008 – Year 2012. According to the Inspection Planning, there are 20 
equipments need to be inspected. 19 equipments are subjected for external inspection 
only and 1 equipment subjected for Extensive (Internal & External Inspection). 










Table 4.25: Estimated costs for the inspection of the Year 2008 – 2012 for Duyong CPP 
 
Item No. Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 2  Offshore rate for an Inspection Engineer 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 2  Offshore rate for a Qualified Inspector 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Opening Vessel 
 Visual Inspection (External & Internal ) 
 NDE-Ultrasound Thickness Measurement 




















From the analysis of estimation of inspection costs with and without RBI for DUYONG 
CPP, the trend were observed and represented in Figure 4.5. The total inspection costs are 
cumulative amount of five years.  
From the figure, it is clearly shown that the total costs of inspection are reduced after the 




























4.3.3 INSPECTION COSTS ESTIMATION FOR BARONIA DP-J 
4.3.3.1 Pressure Vessel 
In BNDP-J facilities, there are only 2 pressure vessels installed which are V-0001 and V-
008. Compared to Duyong CPP, costs of inspecting Pressure Vessel in BNDP-J is smaller 
due to the number of the installed pressure vessels. In quoting the costs of full coverage 
inspection of both pressure vessels regardless its criticality, a lot of aspects need to be 
taken care of like mobilization and demobilization of manpower, tools and equipments 
used for inspection, offshore rate for the manpower, etc. In fact, it is the same as analyzed 
in estimating inspection costs for Duyong CPP Inspection activity. 
Costs of mobilizing and demobilizing manpower for inspection in BNDP-J can be higher 
compared to Duyong CPP due its location. BNDP-J located 30km offshore of Miri, 
Sarawak while Duyong CPP is located at the offshore of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Sometimes, they may require engineer and inspector from Peninsular Malaysia and by 
doing that may affect the costs of mobilizing and mobilizing them. However, in this 
analysis and cost estimation, we consider the cost of mobilizing manpower is consistent. 
Assume that the manpower is mobilized and demobilized within the platform and 
Sarawak. 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Estimation of Inspection costs without RBI 
The following table shows the estimated inspection costs for one pressure vessels: 
 
Table 4.26: Estimated inspection costs for one pressure vessels in BNDP-J 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 1  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 












 Opening Vessel 
 Visual (External &Internal) 
 NDE-UT 
 Eddy Current/IRIS 









TOTAL RM 20,392.50 
 
If both the pressure vessels is inspected at the same time, we can calculate the by 
multiply the total cost by two. But we can consider mobilizing and demobilizing the 
manpower to be once and the offshore rate and standby rate for both engineers and 
inspector is maintained.  
 
Cost of inspecting both V-800 & V-1000 = 
   RM20,392.50 x 2 – (RM2,350.00 + RM962.50) = RM37,472.50 
 
Above calculation reflect the total amount of inspection costs for both pressure vessels 
regardless is criticality for an interval of 5 years. 
 
4.3.3.1.2 Estimation of Inspection Cost with RBI 
Introducing RBI to the inspection of the pressure vessels has affected the overall 
inspection costs. Referring to the inspection plan developed. During the RBI is in 
progress in year 2005, only V-0001 need to have a full coverage of inspection and V-800 
is schedule to be inspected in Year 2009 and 2014. Which means the inspection cost is 
estimated as one pressure vessel is inspected.  
The cost estimation for the following year is divided into two time interval which are 
Period 1 (Year 2006 – 2010) and Period 2 (Year 2011 – 2015). 
During period 1, there is only one Internal Inspection for V-800 which only covers Partial 
Visual Inspection in 2009. The inspection require shutdown to open the vessel. The cost 
estimation for V-800 inspection is as follows: 
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Table 4.27: Cost estimation for V-800 inspection 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Opening Vessel 
 Visual (Internal) 









TOTAL RM 8,390.00 
 
During the Period 2, there are two inspection need to be conducted onto V-800 in Year 
2014. The costs estimation for the inspection are as follows: 
 
Table 4.28: Estimation costs of inspection for two pressure vessels in BNDP-J 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Visual (External) 
 NDE-UT 







TOTAL RM 9,082.50 
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4.3.3.2 Piping 
In BNDP-J there are total of 13 piping circuits. These piping circuits transporting crude 
oil from the wellhead to be processed in the Processing Platform. Inspection of piping 
can be conducted together with inspection of pressure vessel. However, in this section, 
we will discuss the cost estimation of inspecting piping systems only. 
Piping usually being inspected according to its system. As for BNDP- J, there are 13 
piping system in the facilities. Methods that are usually applied for piping inspection are 
Visual Inspection and Ultrasound Thickness Measurement. 
 
 
4.3.3.2.1 Estimation of Inspection Cost without RBI 
Following illustrates the costs estimation for inspection of one piping system.  
 
Table 4.29: Estimation for inspection of one piping system in BNDP-J 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 1  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 NDE-UT Thickness Measurement  
 Visual Inspection (External) 










If all 13 piping system is inspected at the same time, we can calculate the by multiply the 
total cost by 13. But we can consider mobilizing and demobilizing the manpower to be 
once and the offshore rate and standby rate for both engineers and inspector is 
maintained.  
 
Table 4.30: Estimation of Inspection costs for all piping circuits in BNDP-J 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 6  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 6  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 NDE-UT Thickness Measurement  
 Visual Inspection (External) 






TOTAL RM 110,353.00 
 
Conventionally, inspection activity for piping is conducted based on time or condition of 
the piping. For the purpose of estimation of cost of inspection, it is assumed that for a 
period 5 years, about 7 piping circuits need to be inspected due to their conditions. The 








Table 4.31: Estimated Inspection Costs without RBI for Year 2006-2010 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 6  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 6  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 NDE-UT Thickness Measurement  
 Visual Inspection (External) 





TOTAL RM 56,353.00 
 
Table 4.32: Estimated Inspection Costs without RBI for Year 2011-2015 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 6  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 6  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 NDE-UT Thickness Measurement  




TOTAL RM 53,353.00 
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4.3.3.2.2 Estimation of Inspection Cost with RBI 
Implementing RBI on the piping circuit of BNDP-J has affected the overall inspection 
costs. During the RBI is in progress (Year 2005) there are 11 piping circuits subjected for 
NDE-UT and 5 subjected for External Visual Inspection. The total cost of inspection for 
that year for piping circuits is estimated as follows: 
 
Table 4.33: Estimated total cost of inspection for that year for piping 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 4  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 2  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 NDE-UT Thickness Measurement  
 Visual Inspection (External) 






TOTAL RM 58,017.00 
 
For the Period 1 (Year 2006 – 2010) there are 5 piping circuits subjected for External 







Table 4.34: estimated cost for the inspection for Year 2006-2010 of BNDP-J 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 1  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 













TOTAL RM 18,552.50 
 
For the Period 2 (Year 2010 – 2015), 2 piping circuits subjected for External Visual 














Table 4.35: Estimated inspection costs for Year 2010-2015 in BNDP-J 
 
Item No Quantity Description Price (RM) 
1 1  Offshore rate for Inspection Engineers 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 





2 1  Offshore rate for Qualified Inspectors 
(based on 12 hours) 
 Mob & Demob rate 








 Visual Inspection (External) 





TOTAL RM 21,425.50 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Overall Inspection Cost with RBI for Piping & Pressure Vessel 
 
Year 2005:  
  RM 58,017.00 + RM 20,392.50 = RM78,409.00 
 
Year 2006 – 2010: 
  RM 18,552.50 + RM 8,390.00 = RM 26,942.50 
 
Year 2011 – 2015: 





From the analysis of estimation of inspection costs with and without RBI for BNDP-J, 
the trend were observed and represented in Figure 4.6. The total inspection costs are 
cumulative amount of five years.  
From the figure, it is clearly shown that the total inspection costs are reduced with the 





























4.3.3.4 Production Loss 
RBI should predict when the equipment is going to fail due to certain degradation 
mechanisms. From that prediction, the user can develop the inspection plan to rectify the 
problem and lower the risk so that the equipment can operate safely. Shutdown due to 
equipment failure can affect the production of the facilities. As for BNDP-J, the 
production loss per hour due to failure of any equipment and piping are assumed as 
follows: 
a) Total Production for BNDP-J Oil Output = USD18/barrel x 7094 barrels/day  
= USD 127,692 /day 
= USD 5320.50 / hour 
b) Gas Output = USD 921/MMSCFx 24.087 MMscfd 
          = USD 22,184 /day 
                     = USD 924/hour 
c) Therefore, total production loss due to equipment failure is estimated as  



















4.3.2 OPTIMIZING INSPECTION ACTIVITY 
The case studies show that implementing Risk-Based Inspection, inspection activity can 
be optimized by: 
I. Increasing activity level or frequency if insufficient reduction in risk occurs, or 
II. Decreasing activity level or frequency if no gain in risk reduction results from the 
higher level of inspections. 
 
The followings are general guidelines that were obtained from the case studies that may 
be used for inspection optimization. 
a) Damage factors can usually be kept close to one by inspection activities of a 
moderate extent. Values exceeding ten can usually be avoided. 
b) Damage factors significantly greater than ten may be calculated when an 
inspection program that has not previously been on risk is first evaluated. 
Equipment items showing these higher values should receive first priority for 
inspection optimization. Within this sets of equipment items. Those with the 
highest risk should be evaluated first. 
c) Some equipment that had been inspected multiple times and has confirmed low 
damage rates may be over-inspected. Alternate plan to reduce inspection activities 
or frequency can be evaluated through the technical modules to determine the 
effect of risk. Within this sets of equipment items, those with the lowest risk 
should be evaluated first. 
d) Equipment that is subjected to a large uncertainty in the damage rate (as 
expressed in the (Technical Module) will require frequent or thorough inspections 
to keep risks levels low, at least until sufficient history on performance  has been 
established. 
e) Equipment that is approaching the end of its life due to corrosion or other 
deterioration requires increased inspection activities to be sure that the limits of 
deterioration (e.g. corrosion allowance) are not exceeded. Increased inspection 
will not reduce the damage factor once the remaining life has been consumed. 
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f) Inspection program option should be projected over a significant portion, at least 
half, of the equipment‘s intended remaining life. Damage factors may tend to 
increase later in the equipment life if insufficient inspections are performed. 
 
These guidelines are summarizes in table below: 
 




Damage Factor, Before/after Inspection Damage Factor Comments 
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 
6 
(0.08) 




1/1   1/1 1/1 indicated the damage factor was 
the same before and after 
inspection. No inspection are done 
for Plan 2 and Plan 3 
15 
(0.20) 
2/1 10/2 2/1 10/5 Plan 4 has not performed enough 
inspections. Confidence in the 
corrosion rate does not outweigh 




1/1 15/3 1/1 15/8 Plan 2 has not performed enough 
inspections. Confidence in the 
corrosion rate does not outweigh 
the possibility that a higher rate 
exists. 
 
Table 4.37: Inspection activity evaluation for risk reduction inspection optimization 
 
Steps Purpose Evaluation 
Step 1 Baseline Risk Ranking Perform risk ranking of current system 
Step 2 Risk Reduction From the set of highest risk items, select those that 
also have a high probability of failure due to a high 
damage subfactors. Evaluate optional inspection 
plans to reduce the risk and implement the plan 
selected. 
Step 3 Inspection Optimization From the set of lowest risk items, select those that 
have a low probability of failure due to a low 
damage factor. Evaluate optional inspection plans to 
find the optional amount of inspection effort 




4.3.2.1 Inspection Work Plan for Duyong Central Processing Platform 
The purpose of the Inspection Work Plan is to optimize the inspection activity by putting 
the necessary inspection for a certain type of Degradation Mechanisms.  
There are only continuous rate models are subjected to inspection, thus inspection tasks 
are suggested for rate models only. In some cases, inspection methods are suggested for 
susceptibility mechanisms. These are intended to detect damage, but not to monitor 
development of damage over time, i.e. damage is detected it should be sized, repair if 
necessary, and conditions causing shall be removed and permanent effective corrosion 
mitigation shall be implemented. 
 
APPENDIX 4N shows the full Inspection Work Plan of Duyong Central Processing 
Platform 
 
4.3.2.2 Inspection Work Plan for Baronia Drilling Platform-J 
The purpose of the Inspection Work Plan is to optimize the Inspection activity in BNDP-J 
so that it can be cost effective and help reducing the risk of the equipment by suggesting 
appropriate rectification. Table in the appendix shows the Inspection Work Plan that was 
developed by the RBI team members of BNDP-J. From the plan, we can see that 
Inspection method is different depending on the damage mechanisms. For example, 
NDE-UT is conducted for internal corrosion and visual inspection is conducted for 
external corrosion.  
The Inspection Work Plan also suggests the coverage of the inspection. Coverage for 
each of the inspection to be conducted is depending on the extent of the damage 
mechanisms. An equipment doesn‘t need a 100% coverage of inspection if there is only 
certain area are damage or corroded. For example, as in the table, only 10% of the 
potential location will be inspected if there is corrosion occurs and for pressure vessel, 
there are certain parts that need more attention such as nozzles, shells, etc. 
 





CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 The project concluded that Risk-Based Inspection was properly implemented on 
offshore facilities. From the case studies that has been conducted shows that the 
methodology and process applied by the offshore operators are inline with the 
API Recommended Practice (API 580 & API 581). Both methodologies (API 
Recommended Practice and PETRONAS-RBI) derived similar results which are 
shown by the analysis and Risk Matrix (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4). 
 Thus, the objective of implementing RBI on offshore facilities to maximize 
 facilities and equipments availability and optimize the inspection activity can be 
 achieved. 
 
 In conducting RBI analysis, sufficient data is essential. As more data were made 
available, more assumptions can be eliminated and more accurate result can be 
obtained.  
 
 Implementation of RBI in offshore facilities generates benefits for the facilities: 
1. RBI optimizes the inspection activity. Inspection Planning developed 
allows consideration for reduction of inspection activities in those areas 
that have a lower risk or where the inspection activity has little or no affect 
on the associated risks. Thus the number of inspection activity and 
frequency can be optimized by inspecting only the necessary equipments. 
2. Inspection costs can be more effectively managed. Resources can be 
applied or shifted to those areas identified as a higher risk or targeted 
based on the strategy selected. These results in inspection resources being 

























Figure 5.1 b: Estimatred Inspection Costs for BNDP-J 
 
 










5.2.1 Duyong CPP 
The implementation of RBI in Duyong CPP only started in the year 2002. To implement 
RBI on Duyong CPP they need base line data for every equipment and piping circuits so 
that less assumption can be made and the results are more accurate. They found that it is 
so difficult to locate and find the data since that there thousands of equipments in the 
facilities and sometimes the documents are no longer relevant for current review. 
It is recommended for the RBI team of Duyong CPP to reevaluate their implementation 
of RBI. An effort to locate the necessary data and documents need to be more aggressive. 
This is important so that the assumptions that were made during the first RBI practice can 
be eliminated. Thus, will result more accurate calculations and risk ranking of the 
equipments.  
 
5.2.1 Baronia DP-J 
The intent of RBI implementation on BNDP-J is to manage the probability of failure 
associated with the components while establishing and optimized inspection program. As 
more data is gathered from upcoming inspections and damage mechanism continues to be 
defined, the final result should be updated to provide guidance for further inspections.  
By managing the inspection activities, it will improve the equipment condition 
confidence and consequently, the risk associated with the equipment and piping can be 
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